

Migration as a killjoy.

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London 1517. The day when in the capital city of England large outbreaks of riots directed against French and Flemish protestant refugees which has since become known as "Evil May Day". A crowd of around a thousand young men pitched against the aliens, plundered their homes and accused them of heresy, stealing food, drunkenness and debauchery. and, of course, the French had their eyes on the English women. Only after a tough intervention by the Kings forces could the rebellion be suppressed and the perpetrators punished. This is one of the many incidents that illustrate that citizens are often initially repelled by everything that comes from outside. People are pack animals and cannot do without a shared identity, and certainly not whilst confronting others. Social psychologists have to explain this phenomenon by the terms "ingroup" and "outgroup". There are situations where the conflicts between groups become completely out of control and lead to massive massacres and pogroms, although in most cases it is only by name calling and negative imagery. Once one is accustomed to the other, the differences disappear with the years. Remember the mild mockery in the form of "Kraut farces" ' from the 17th and 18th century, meant to ridicule the many "dumb and retarded German immigrants". We saw the same reaction, much more viciously, in the February 2012 set up "hotline Eastern and Central Europe" by the right-wing political party PVV, that after initial troubles with aliens from that part of Europe soon died a quiet death. The recent –sometimes violent- protests against the establishment of centres for refugees, where protests are often more focused against local authorities than against the refugees themselves, fit in the tradition. In that respect, there is nothing new under the sun. The final matter is how societies handle this kind of protest by worried citizens. We see that both in London of 1517 and as today in some Dutch municipalities, the authorities have benefitted by restoring order as soon as possible. When they fail they legitimize citizens to take the law into their own hands. So there are striking parallels between past and present, but not everything has remained the same. From the nineteenth century, the established and the outsiders have become a national, sometimes even a European character. Not that these local identities disappeared herewith, as the protests against the refugee centres show, but nationalist feelings that are in the past century do undeniably play a larger role in our image of "others". That has to do with the fact that States created much sharper boundaries between its citizens and foreigners. The question is then, when and why European countries started to check their borders and how they have done so. Why did authorities see certain groups of immigrants as an insurmountable problem and others not? But also, about the opposing forces that have been in the game over the years. Who then looks good, will see that for one group of refugees there was a period of support, whilst those in another period were seen as a special problem. That had rarely to do with the characteristics of the newcomers, but often with the policy and the imaging by Governments, civil society and the media. In the current media attention for refugees empathy and fear prevail. The anxious and sometimes downright hostile responses to the arrival of refugees in Europe don't stand

alone and are only to be understood by looking at the years with increased uneasiness about migration. If we want to understand the current contradictions in the debate on refugees, we must first reflect on the historical roots of such emotions.

In this lecture, I will reflect on three themes: immigrants, borders and support for refugees. They form the historical framework in which the recent arrival of refugees and the responses to it are to be understood better. We start our story in the nineteenth century, when borders hardly formed a barrier for people to relocate.

1: Open borders: Europe until World War I

Till 1914 few obstacles were laid in the way of migrants. Most countries abolished passports around 1860 and there were hardly any more border controls. Only from 1892, the American Government started the screening of immigrants on Ellis Island, within the view of Manhattan. Those with infectious diseases and beggars found the door closed but 99% of the newcomers were admitted into the United States. At least after they had listed their personal details, address and any employer. This easy attitude did not apply for Chinese and other Asian migrant workers who were kept out beginning from the end of the 19th century.

Chinese were not the first migrants who met with negative stereotyping. The European migrants were also met with all kinds of prejudice. Jewish Europeans, especially those from Eastern Europe, but also Italians and Irish were considered as problematic, with racial and cultural (religious) characteristics competing to be the priority. Known, is the stigmatisation of the Irish in England and in the United States. Especially of their Catholicism and their loyalty to the Pope in Rome (a "foreign" head of State), being that they are incompatible with the liberal principles of freedom and the separation of State and Church. This anti-Catholicism mingled with racist stereotypes. So the British magazine Punch in 1862 painted Irish ("ape-faced and small-headed") half savages that in terms of evolution were stuck halfway between the gorilla and the "Negro". But above all their Catholic faith was considered to be extremely dangerous and threatening, especially after Irish independence fighters, forerunners of the IRA, reinforced their fight against the English with dynamite. So in the first half of the year 1880 more than ten bombs exploded in London, including the London underground being a target.

It is striking how much stereotyping about the Papal Irish in the 19th and early 20th century match that with Muslims in the present time. So, Catholics would therefore have the intention to conquer the world by getting as many children as possible ("breeding") and thus to seize surreptitiously power and so to bring everyone under the dictatorial Papal yoke. Also the men should treat their women as inferior and should have nothing to do with liberal (Democratic) principles. Although Irish access in England and the United States could not be denied, those negative images by itinerant anti-Irish demagogues regularly led to violent rioting, causing in England dozens of deaths during the fifties and sixties in the 19th century.

Refugees

The long nineteenth century was characterized in Europe and North America by a fairly stable international order with few wars and conflicts. In the formal sense of the word there were therefore few refugees to be seen. However, that would change dramatically with the outbreak of World War I.

2: Passports and border controls: the birth of the alien (1914-1945)

In 1914 countries used passports for entry whilst also guarding their borders. That did not mean that migration came to a halt. The war brought millions to move, as soldiers, workers and of course of refugees. Those soldiers were not only Europeans, but from 1917, also Americans. When the war finally ended, the era of migratory freedom returned immediately. Inspired by the Russian revolution of 1917 it was, especially in Germany, particularly restless. Communist and Socialist workers threatened to take over power and the fear of revolution made Governments scared of foreign rioters. In addition, during the war a shift occurred in the relationship between citizens and aliens. The difference between its citizens and foreigners manifested itself not only in the form and colour of the Passport, but also in the rights and obligations related to State citizenship.

Despite this gradual change in thinking about nationals and aliens, the classic liberalism, characterized by a State which interfered as little as possible with society, for the time being became the dominant paradigm. Because when peace finally came to be in the autumn of 1918, it did not take long before the call for abolition of travel documents and border controls sounded again. Many, especially traders and employers, saw the war as only an irritating interlude.

Reciprocity and a borderless Europe

The effectiveness of the imported foreigner legislation after the war was considerably limited by the principle of reciprocity: the principle that countries are less strict for foreign nationals from countries where also many of their own citizens work and live. For the Netherlands at the beginning of the 20th century, and actually still, especially valid in Germany. In 1910 Dutch people formed less than 11% of all foreign workers in Germany. After centuries of mass immigration from German territories, there now lived and worked more Dutch people in Germany than vice versa. That situation worked so that Germans also enjoyed certain preferential treatment in the Netherlands. Because all restrictions on the migration of German men and women, such as the tens of thousands of housemaids in the inter-war period, should have repercussions for the position of Dutch citizens in Germany. And the last had to be avoided at all times. Netherlands, having in 1920 a compact seven million inhabitants, was considered overcrowded and it was not intended that the migrant workers in the Ruhr area should return. To give each other's citizens a privileged position, many countries therefore concluded bilateral conventions, such as the Netherlands and German Establishment Treaty of 1904. The freedom of establishment was guaranteed on each other's territory and only if foreign nationals succumbed to begging, they could be deported. Unless the country of origin paid the bill, such as Netherlands did with the Dutch unemployed in Germany, hoping therefore they would remain there. That Location Convention may seem an echo of days long gone, in fact the reciprocity principle rules to this day to a large extent of migration policies in many countries, and with that the control of migration by national States. Indeed, it is the basis of the final European integration and the removal of internal border controls. Before we delve deeper into that more recent development, there is still for the best a moment to remain standing in the interwar period, the period between the two world wars. Because then not only were the foundations laid of the current immigration policy, but we also see the beginning of two other developments that are closely linked to the principle of reciprocity: 1) the ideal of a United Europe with open borders; 2) the exclusion of foreigners once the mutuality has been lost.

The standard history of European integration begins in the 1950s, when politicians like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman took the initiative with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), which culminated in the current 28 countries counting as the European Union. But actually that story had already started by the end of the first world war, when many inhabitants of Europe saw the removal of the borders between States as a means to a permanent peace. Taken in tow by colourful types such as the wealthy Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi coming from the dismantled Danube monarchy, and in the Netherlands the Editor-in-Chief of the Haarlem Dagblad newspaper, Robert Peereboom, a great enthusiasm for the Pan-European movement arose. As Stefan Zweig in his *World of yesterday. Memories of a European* (1944) wrote: "How provincial and artificial, are the barriers and customs officers at the borders, what a contradiction to the spirit of our time". In 1925 there was an excited atmosphere of brotherhood and "Europäische Gemeinschaft" and on the real political scene the German Prime Minister Gustav Stresemann and his French counterpart Aristide Briand were a year later awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize. With a little bit of luck it would have been possible for these two statesmen to achieve a lasting peace between the European arch-rivals, inspired by the prevailing European fever. We know it became different, but as Willem de Wagt makes clear in his book *We Europeans*, the (fictional) creation of a "Federal Nations of Europe" in 1931 was less unlikely than we might think. The ultimate failure of the rapprochement between France and Germany during the early thirties started a period in which all countries protect their own labour markets and immigrants that were a problem. In the roaring twenties however, virtually no one saw the coming of the economic and political catastrophe.

Refugees and support

How about refugees in the period 1914-1945? How did authorities react and what were the consequences to be had for the support? On August 4, 1914, the German armies attacked neutral Belgium in order to have a wide front to invade arch-enemy France. The unexpectedly powerful resistance by the Belgian army enabled this plan to partly fail, so the Germans took vengeance on the Belgian cities and civilians. Eleven days later the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina encouraged the southern neighbours: refugees were welcome. Although she probably never thought that so many would come. The siege of Antwerp caused a huge exodus 40,000 soldiers and around a million citizens, of whom eventually 100,000 would stay until the end of 1918. The Government reacted slightly less excitedly and left the reception, initially, as was the spirit of the time, over to private, often religious, reception committees and citizens. The empathy among the population was overwhelming and there were massive collections of clothing and money. Although many families in the southern provinces took Belgian refugees into their homes, the amount of people was simply too great. And when it became clear that the stay of the Belgians wasn't going to be temporary and could last for years, the State also had to take action. But reluctantly. Especially for those who could not be housed privately and those with little money, refugee camps were built throughout the country. Just as now there was not only empathy and enthusiasm, even though it was recorded in the collective memory. Although prime minister Cort van der Linden propagated the welcoming point of view, his Secretary of war preferred sending back all Belgians as soon as it was calm again after the fall of Antwerp on October 9. In a circular to the municipalities a few days later, it was noticed that a quick return was preferred and therefore some "soft pressure" was justified. And also then there were plenty of complaints about brutal and ungrateful Belgians and of the high financial and social costs

of the reception. Unemployed workers especially thought that the Belgians were pampered. So it was to be read in a letter to the editor of a newspaper on October 20, 1914: "If that Belgians don't like coarse bread, the basket of rolls is ready for them. Come on, people, all against something so unfair! Between hospitality and delicious feasting is distinction."

The reality, however, was different. In the camps, where a third of the refugees was accommodated, life was no fun. Leaky and draughty barracks and bad food, combined with strict rules, and the gnawing uncertainty about the fate of friends and family, regularly led to incidents and discontent. Sometimes even Belgians came out in rebellion, in which case it was noticed that sometimes public opinion agreed with them. Many citizens and newspapers also found that this situation was unacceptable and urged the Government to improve the conditions. But the reverse also occurred. In some regions, such as in the Frisian Gaasterland, where some 4,000 Belgian soldiers were billeted, villagers complained that the Belgians drunk too much and the Frisian girls were not safe. Finally, unions demanded that the Belgians were excluded from the labour market because they stole the jobs of the Dutch. In short, empathy and fear were exchanged with each other, but in the end the Netherlands could house quite a large number of refugees (being now, around 300,000) for a longer time. And the same goes for the warring countries of England and France who received 150,000 and 325,000 Belgian refugees respectively.

After the Belgian refugees internment (German, British and Russian) soldiers returned to their homeland, it remained for a long time quiet on the refugee front, until Adolf Hitler seized power in 1933 and immediately made clear that Jewish Germans – and the same applied to left-wing opponents of the regime – had to expect nothing good. In the beginning it might have been worse, but it wasn't long before the number of emigrants grew rapidly. Approximately 270,000 Jewish Germans and Austrians left their country. Most ended up in France. Belgium, the Netherlands and England, and the lucky ones reached countries in North and South America.

The Netherlands, could, because of the previously mentioned Treaty of Establishment from 1904, initially not refuse Germans, including Jewish Germans. But when the Nazis robbed them so quickly of their civil rights, the Netherlands (and other countries) went on declaring them as unwanted: they were not German citizens any more. The so called "Oostjoden" (Eastern Jews), coming from Poland and other Eastern European countries, were no longer issued with visas anyway, from the end of 1933, arguing that they had a "completely different mentality" and with a much lower level of civilization. In addition, they would be a threat to public "moral health". Jewish refugees from Germany were not much better off. The Minister of Justice at that time, Van Schaik, wanted all of them to go back, preferably because of "race, economic and social considerations". Because the longer they stayed, the more difficult it would be to get rid of them again.

The arguments and language used by Western European countries launched a betrayal of an anti-Semitic basic tone. So the Dutch Justice Minister argued that by admitting Jewish refugees in the labour market would only excite anti-Semitic feelings among the population. And when the Nazis robbed Jewish Germans of their civil rights, this was reason for the Dutch Government to categorically refuse them. So a circular was labelled from May 1938 that the refugees were "undesirable elements" in Dutch society "who in all cases should be stopped at the border and if possible, returned. Especially if they were directly life-threatening. To close the border as hermetically as possible, 300 new border inspectors were appointed to bring this policy into practice, but – as so often – they could not prevent that and finally an estimated 35,000 and 50,000 Jewish refugees settled in the Netherlands.

The history of those Jewish refugees teaches us that if the Government openly shows a negative attitude, public opinion quickly follows. Certainly if the stereotypes about refugees join in already existing prejudices. In that respect, there are parallels between the latent and sometimes overt anti-Semitism in the 1930s and the questioning of Muslims and of Islam in the current time. Obviously, the fear of Muslims nowadays is strongly fuelled by Islamic terrorism, something that was absent with the Jews. There are striking similarities in the groups that are stigmatized in a very general way as "non-European" religion, and as threatening and impossible to assimilate. This brings us to the term "support". In the case of the Jewish refugees it was largely missing, except among the Jewish people in the Netherlands. Although many of them were not waiting for their German fellow believers, they were worried that this would adversely affect their own position. The New Israelite weekly magazine in May 1938 supported openly the Dutch Government who stated that it had the duty to guard the Netherlands "own land and people". The editor agreed with Minister Goseling of Justice that "an even greater increase in foreigners would bring the national economy to become out of balance". This set-up and the latent anti-Semitism in Dutch society, which was widespread in Catholic circles, limited any affiliation with the Jewish refugees.

3: The Thirty glorious years: careless and porous borders (1945-1975)

In the migration history of Europe is the post-war period known as the age of unprecedented immigration, particularly from non-European areas. That's not wrong. Although Europeans were particularly mobile for centuries, there had never been seen so many newcomers from other continents as in this period. Even if we dispense with the modern spread of humans from Africa over the rest of the world about 60,000 years ago. In total, there settled in the second half of the 20th century nearly 25 million migrants from other continents in Europe. Roughly there were three different categories: 1) post-colonial migrants from the (former) European colonies; 2) migrant workers, mostly in the context of targeted recruitment campaigns (guest workers) and 3) refugees.

Germany got more than six million newcomers, including two million from Turkey and the same number from the (former) Soviet Union ("Aussiedler, displaced persons"). Followed by the United Kingdom with 5.4 million migrants, especially from the former colonies in South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and the Caribbean. France is with a million less number three on the list, with Algeria as the main area of origin. And then comes the Netherlands, with almost two million: the most from the colonies in the East (Indonesia) and the West (Suriname, Netherlands Antilles) and the rest from the guest worker countries Turkey and Morocco.

Given the long history of prejudice against non-Europeans and the stricter demarcation between citizens and aliens, we can ask ourselves why they were actually allowed to establish themselves in Europe. A frequently given answer is that "they are here, because we were there in the past". This is assuredly partially correct, but that is too simplistic. It was not at all the intention that colonial nationals would come in such large numbers to the "metropolis".

After the war, however, it was increasingly difficult to keep to that principle. The slowly penetrating awareness of what the Nazis had done with their racist regime, with the Holocaust as macabre rock bottom, caused a fundamental re-assessment of the humanitarian international order, with the United Nations as the most important institution. For the first time, there became world-wide racism and discrimination on the

basis of ethnicity and religion being condemned, and anchored in new global organizations such as the United Nations and UNESCO, both founded in the autumn of 1945. But it took until the 1960s before racism and discrimination were condemned and formed the heart of an ethical revolution that had the equality of humans, and human rights, as a starting point. At least as important, however, were geopolitical and colonial ideas.

Indonesian Dutch

In Netherlands, the unexpected colonial heritage appeared soon after the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945. With the surrender of the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies the situation was definitively changed. The occupation had given an enormous boost to the existing nationalism and the Dutch were soon the butt of the open aggression of nationalist youth. All of a sudden it turned out that the Dutch were supreme not at all, and for nationalists as Hatta and Sukarno the Indonesia independent from Netherlands had come. For the old colonizers and those who had supported the regime, such as the large group of "halfblood" people, Indonesian Dutch and Moluccans who had fought in the colonial army, was no place anymore. Although Netherlands initially wanted to know nothing of the nationalist demands and started with such a 100,000 conscripts in Indonesia a colonial war, it soon turned out to be a rearguard action. Finally left between 1946 and 1964 approximately 300,000 people Dutch-Indies and settled in Netherlands.

The at that time Catholic-Red Governments, from 1948 led by Willem Drees, were not waiting for those immigrants. Netherlands was "full" with ten million inhabitants. A large-scale government campaign to entice Dutch citizens to emigrate to countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, what half a million people did.. In order not to lose face internationally however, Drees and others were forced to admit the refugees from Indonesia. Dutch ex-pats had in any case the right to return, but the Dutch Government wanted to keep the group "Indonesian Dutchmen" as small as possible. Certainly the ' Oriental oriented kampong Eurasians ' would never be able to assimilate, as many thought. To the outside world ("front stage") the government stressed, however, the solidarity with the immigrants by labelling them as "returnees", those who return to the motherland. Even though most were never been in the Netherlands. To create a support the cabinets Drees emphasized that these were Dutch, many of them with a tan, but still. Out of sight of the public ("backstage"), officials who were responsible for the selection tried, in vain, to keep the group as small as possible. The arrival of such a large group of newcomers gave the Government an enormous task. Three percent increase of the population was a big disappointment. The country was partly smashed, there was unemployment and the housing shortage was declared to public enemy number 1. In addition, many Dutch people saw that many of the returnees had never been here and were many Indonesian and Dutch people were faced with (un)veiled racism and discrimination. To prevent that the people became a racial minority, assimilation had priority. Five percent of the social housing was reserved for the Returnees. As with the current recognised refugees (status holders) today stirred up bad blood with the natives, who therefore had to wait even longer on living space. In retrospect it can be seen that the outwardly public policies, combined with an unprecedented long period of economic growth and the fact that the Indonesian Dutch spoke the language already and most were oriented on Netherlands, has considerably facilitated the integration process.

The European project

The colonial route was not the only access to the post-war Europe. Much less conscious, but at least as important, were partly the unintended effects of the European integration. The example of Netherlands is sufficient in order to describe that.

Immigration might officially undesirable, the Netherlands labour market screamed for personal, and the Netherlands worked with loyalty to the formation of a common European labour market. That began in relation to Benelux and that made sure that from 1957 Belgians and Luxembourgers could work without a licence in Netherlands (and vice versa). Also on other levels was worked hard on the liberalisation of the Western European labour market and a common social policy. Whether it's the European Economic Community (EEC), or the Council of Europe, the arrows pointed all in the same direction. So in 1969 all EEC nationals, including Italians, free to cross the border to go to work and live. Dutch policymakers were not happy about it and feared for disruption. In 1973, warned the Ministry of Social Affairs still that by joining the EEC of Great Britain and Ireland the Dutch labour market would be flooded with job seeking British and Irish workers. A belch that is reminiscent of a later Minister of that same Department, Lodewijk Asscher, which in September 2013 predicted that the "dikes would break" as per 1 January 2014, Romanians and Bulgarians had free access. In both cases the predictions were not realized.

Refugees and support in the postwar period

The advance of the Allied forces in Eastern and Western Europe and the collapse of the Nazi Germany led to an unprecedented number of refugees. Tens of millions of Europeans were on the run and many could or did not want to return to their homeland. There were 10 to 12 million survivors of the Nazi work-, concentration and extermination camps. And in addition at least as many displaced persons. Forerunners of the in 1950 established UNHCR, the refugee aid organization of the United Nations, tried as good as possible to give all these refugees, brought together in camps for "Displaced Persons" a normal existence. Often in countries other than where they were born, also outside Europe: in Israel, South America and the United States. Germany alone took seven million so-called "Volksdeutschen", Germans who lived before the war in Eastern European countries like Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia,. With the care for those tens of millions of refugees, internationally was realized that universal human rights should be better guaranteed. The basic principles, were established in 1948 by the United Nations in the Declaration of Human Rights. Three years later followed the 1951 Geneva Convention on the definition and rights of refugees. This last treaty was limited to Europe, but became in 1967 a global validity.

From the moment a State recognizes someone as a refugee, is obliged to adhered two principles: 1) the person in question should not be sent back ("non-refoulement") to the country of origin or to a country that is not careful with asylum procedure; and 2) the State which takes up a refugee is obliged to treat these as favorable as possible and to provide housing, education and access to the labour market. It concerned mainly people who had been placed outside the law by fleeing, and by their status as refugees they got back their civil rights, but then in the country that recognized them as such. This Treaty entered in Netherlands in 1955, a year before the uprising in Hungary against the Russian occupying forces. The Treaty was a real game changer. Where Minister of Justice Goseling in 1938 refused Jewish Germans at the border, precisely *because* he regarded them as refugees, from 1951 the Refugee status guaranteed protection. Although countries were autonomous in determining who was recognized as a refugee, the Convention from 1951 opened a new "ticket office" for

migrants who feared persecution. And from 1967 could also non-Europeans report to this counter

Until the mid-1970s it was still not such a speed. The numbers of refugees were very limited. An exception was the Hungarian rebellion against the Communist regime in 1956. In Netherlands was the enthusiasm for these victims of communism particularly large and consequently, and as a result the Government, in the heyday of the cold war, couldn't stay behind. As with the returnees, we see a big difference between the official response and actual policy. In theater terms we again can make a distinction between "front stage" and "backstage". Externally supported the third Cabinet Drees the rebellion, but behind the scenes officials were given the instruction to enable Hungarians as little as possible and then only those whose professions supported the demands of the Dutch labour market. There would come, 3,300 Hungarians to Netherlands after Norway with 1,500 the lowest number of all countries in Western Europe.

Because the Iron Curtain closed Eastern Europe hermetically, the number of refugees in Western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was particularly low. But also the effects of the globalization of the refugee regime were very limited. Wars and persecutions in Africa effects of the globalization of the refugee regime were very limited. Wars and persecutions in Africa (Uganda) and the repression by authoritarian regimes in Latin America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil), caused a little increase, but the Netherlands had some hundreds of requests for asylum per year. Only in 1980, was the limit of 1000 exceeded.

4: The guest worker trauma and the globalization of the refugee (1975-present)

Borders

If we had asked a random passer-by in 1973 a prediction about the future of migration in Europe, then there was a small chance that these developments in the last quarter of the 20th century would have been foreseen. Because of the oil crisis it seemed to have caused an end to the arrival of guest workers. Moreover, countries such as France and England, the great colonisers of yester-year, had taken measures to limit immigration from their former colonies. And concerning refugees, their numbers had remained very low for the time being. In short, the effect of the post-war global humanitarian regime on immigration to Europe seemed limited. Starting from the 1990s, the European Union developed a weapon that kept unwanted migrants and asylum seekers from other continents at a distance: the visa policy. Where internal borders for Europeans gradually disappeared with the enlargement of the Schengen area, it became from the late 1990s increasingly difficult to reach Europe in the normal legal manner.

The first step on the road to Schengen was made in 1969 with the introduction of a visa requirement for migrants to the Netherlands from a large number of countries in Africa and Asia. The de-limitation of Europe got a major boost with the 1985 Schengen Treaty. In that Luxembourg border triangle, the Benelux countries, France and Germany agreed that the control of persons at the internal borders was going to disappear and there would come a common visa policy. In addition, the Treaty determined that bus and airline companies, as well as ferries, were responsible for bringing back passengers who did not have the necessary visa. The Schengen countries thus transferred from 1990, a part of the border control to private partners. That became such a part of a "remote control", that is to say moving the border control to the country of departure, usually in other continents. Staff of airlines since 2004 at a number of airports were assisted by staff from the immigration services of the various Schengen countries stationed there, the Immigration Liaison Officers. In addition,

carriers risk fines of 3000 euros per person if they do not comply with the new rules: the so-called "carrier sanctions". In 1995 it was organized at last, and the Schengen Treaty became operational. At that time Spain and Portugal had joined, soon followed by 18 other countries. Thus the Schengen countries such as the Netherlands, finally lost the ability to control their own borders, with the exception of the direct air transport from outside the Schengen area.

Schengen, but also earlier measures to stop immigration from the colonies and from recruitment countries of guest workers however, produced very different effects than expected and intended. Despite the desire of de-limiting, in mid-seventies Europe, as we now know, on the eve of significant migrations from other parts of the world. How big the numbers of post-colonial migrants have been, it stayed with an, albeit, large and elongated, knock-on effect. That differed from the global refugee regime.

Refugees and support.

The globalization of the refugee regime, for which the extension of the Refugee Convention laid the foundation in 1967, was noticeable in Europe only during the course the 1980s. Until that time, it concerned several hundred, at most a few thousand asylum seekers a year. The main explanation for the strong increase is the increase, starting in the 1980s, of the number of civil wars and armed conflicts in the adjacent regions of Europe, causing many more people to become adrift. That turnaround started with the overthrow on February 11, 1979 of the regime of the Shah in Iran by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He transformed Iran into a strict Islamic State and suppressed the opposition of his dictatorial regime. The consequence was that tens of thousands of Iranians who, for various reasons, could not find in themselves any way to exist under the new regime, such as left-wing intellectuals, but also young men who did not want to fight in the war against Iraq, left the country. In the 1980s those concerned made up nearly 300,000 people who settled especially in the United States, Canada, Germany and Sweden, followed by another 250,000 refugees in the 1990s. More than 20,000 asked for asylum in the Netherlands.

More or less at the same time, in December 1979, Russian tanks rolled into Afghanistan to suppress the rebellion, supported by the United States and Islamic resistance fighters, the Mujahideen. This led to a ten year Vietnamese-like guerrilla war, that caused six million Afghans to be on the run. By far the most settled in Pakistan and Iran. Others chose, especially in the 1990s, for the United States (300,000) and European countries such as Germany (126,000), England (56,000) and the Netherlands (30,000). A last hot-bed in the Middle East was Iraq. Whose history is well known. The Gulf wars left the country in chaos that led one million Iraqis to flee, from which number, 31,000 went to the Netherlands.

The fourth major conflict area that brought large numbers of refugees to flee was Somalia, in the Horn of Africa. It started in 1977 with the war against Ethiopia, followed by a long civil war that started in 1986 and in which the various warring parties were provided with weapons by the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. Becoming the 'cold war' in Africa. Only in 2007 was there peace in a country that was largely in ruins after forty years of war. Here again, the bulk of the millions of refugees remained in the region. In Europe, England (108,000) was the favourite destination, followed by the Netherlands (31,000), Denmark and Sweden. Some of the Somalis later withdrew to England, making the Somali community in Netherlands shrink from around 30,000 in 2001 to 22,000 in 2009.

But also Europe itself "produced" refugees. Caused by the Yugoslavian civil war that erupted in all its intensity in 1991, that by the 1990s, five million people had to flee. By

far, most remained in their own region, but 700,000 moved to Western Europe, most of whom applied for asylum in Germany. That destination was obvious, because many guest workers from the former Yugoslavia had formed communities there since the 1960s. But also the Netherlands got its share, with around 63,000 Yugoslav refugees in the 1990s.

It was these five groups in the Netherlands that formed more than three quarters of all asylum seekers in the 1990s. Most could not count on a warm welcome. The starting point of the foreign policy was to discourage the arrival of refugees as much as possible, officials and politicians were afraid for a "suck in" effect.

But the most decisive factor remains, however, the situation in the country of origin. This is evident especially if we compare the 1990s with the first decade of the 21st century. Despite stricter rules and the scanty care during the 1990s, the numbers remained particularly high, to collapse after 2000 and suddenly plummeted (Figure 3). Where the numbers for all conflict regions after the turn of the century were greatly reduced by the abatement or end (Balkans) of the fight, they rise again for Iraq (second Gulf war) and the Horn of Africa, where the battle in Somalia flares up again as after the secession in 1999 and in 2006, Ethiopia is back in the fight.

Because in the Netherlands especially not be too unpopular, the Ministry of Justice was sparing with the real refugee status (A). Many asylum seekers were told that they were not allowed to stay. However, for several reasons, just like today, it turned out that it was difficult to enable people to actually return or to put them back across the border. Something that is a constant in Dutch history of guarding the borders. To the outside world ("front stage") a particularly strict asylum policy was suggested, but if we look to the result, it appears every time in practice that it is in fact fairly generous. At least if we consider that approximately 70% of asylum seekers would stay.

As poignantly displayed in the novel *How I got talent for life* by Rodaan Al Galidi, they had to wait for years before they had any status and got to work. That a significant proportion eventually has found a job, is somewhat remarkable. According to recent research that the participation of refugees from the 1990s in labour force sits, after, 15 years at an average 55%. Lower than under the Dutch (70%), but given the starting position and the lack of networks, this is not a bad result at all.

Support

With the exception of the Yugoslavs, in large part Muslims, the Government showed "front stage" that refugees were not welcome. In any case their asylum applications would be viewed very critically. The idea that most refugees were actually not 'real' refugees, but above all people with economic motives, was fairly dominant in the 1990s. Welcoming support was limited and the protests against asylum centers in municipalities were no exception. The cause is not only the repelling preparation of the "purple" cabinets in the 1990s. Another important reason is globalization and the larger cultural differences between Europeans and refugees, especially those who come from Islamic countries. The only groups of asylum seekers who managed to escape this, were those who were considered as victims of regimes that were seen as anti-European, such as the Communists in Vietnam and the ultra-nationalist Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia.

If we explain the decreasing identification and thus the reduced support for asylum seekers in the current time, the characteristics of the migrants then are not enough. As with the Belgian and Jewish refugees, returnees, and the Hungarians, the attitude of the Government is important as to whether they emphasize the differences or the

similarities. To illustrate this, we compare the large difference in the political and social debate on refugees in the 1990s compared with the current time.

A comparison with the 1990s.

In the current polarized debate it can often be heard, even among politicians of the Netherlands middle parties, that Europe threatens to succumb on the arrival of asylum seekers and our prosperity and security are in danger and refugees cannot be housed. Is that true? To find out it is useful to look in the past. Also at that time it concerned large numbers, and partly from the same regions. Also it is good to realize that the European Union, one of the richest parts of the world, with 500 million inhabitants, will not fall down because of the current numbers of asylum seekers. In history there have been larger population movements. Even if all the Syrian refugees would come to Europe it would mean an increase of less than 1%. You would not say that when you see the images of large groups of people walking through border countries on the TV and in the newspapers, but migration is much less massive than is thought. As a reminder, globally only 3% of the world's population live in a country different from where they were born and that share has remained stable for decades. Thus most of the people on earth are not moving to another country. A third of that international migrants are fugitives. That is disturbing, but as long as there are conflicts, famines or climate disasters, there will be refugees. And more than 90% of all those refugees are being re-absorbed into their own region, outside the EU. The idea of a refugee crisis is a rather Eurocentric perspective.

The crisis that the EU is now going through is a political crisis. This is evident especially if we make a comparison with earlier periods with high numbers of refugees, particularly during and immediately after the two world wars. For the current time above all are the similarities and differences with the refugees after the fall of the wall in 1989 interesting. The difference now is not so much the numbers or the origin. In the last decade of the 20th century there were significantly more than in the past five years. Only until 2021 around 45,000 refugees per year were coming to the Netherlands, the level matches that of the 1990s. And also where the origin is concerned, the similarities are more significant than the differences.

At that time one in four asylum seekers came from the former Yugoslavia, but even then the majority were coming from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia). The differences are not the numbers or origin, but the changed political dynamics, which has ensured that asylum seekers are regarded as a much bigger threat than twenty years ago.

There are four factors that makes the current situation different than that in the 1990s: Populism, terrorism, social media and visibility.

Populism.

The arrival of refugees in the 1990s led, especially in the former East Germany, to violent protests, with hundreds of attacks on asylum seekers' centres, but there were – apart from the French National Front – hardly any populist parties that had immigration, refugees or Islam on their agenda. That changed in the 21 century with the rise of the Dutch PVV, UKIP, the Dansk Folkeparti, FPÖ and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This anti-immigration sentiment, also has grown in Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the establishment of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Because of their success other parties feel themselves forced into moving in their direction. So it has become normal to talk about refugees as an insurmountable logistic and financial

problem and especially as an ideological threat: Muslims who subvert our (Christian, Western) society, whether or not by means of (sexual) violence. Calls from Pegida in Germany and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to revolt against the reception of refugees, caused further polarization, a wave of threats and collective violence. That is not to say that protest and violence did not occur, but it is now much more widespread and focuses primarily against Muslims who get introduced as an existential threat for Europe.

Terrorism.

This fear of Muslims and Islam of course cannot be separated from the increased terror worldwide since 9/11 by Al Qaeda, IS, Boko Haram, and radicalized European Muslims. The attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Paris in 2015 have further fed this climate of fear. In the Netherlands, supplemented by the horrific murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, by a son, of Moroccan parents, born in the Netherlands. That brought the threat of international Islamic terrorism really close. Other attacks and atrocities have resulted in an ever more anxious, but also to a social climate of islamophobia. Then it not the question, as mentioned earlier, to "criticism of Islam" as such, but to very generalizing biased, and often apocalyptic views, of what Muslims should be, do and think.

Social media.

Although it might be still too early to assess the impact of the mobilizing function of social media to measure, is clear that Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp groups made it much easier to mobilize people against asylum seekers. Including the rapidity, through consciously or unconsciously spreading all sorts of "hoax" messages. But also calls for collective violence can be sent with the touch of a button. So buzzed "death to the Muslims" Whatsapp calls prior to the storming of a Sports Hall in Woerden where Syrian refugees had found temporary shelter on Friday October 9, 2015. Social media also contributes to the fact that opponents of the inclusion of refugees no longer believe the normal media. This "Lügenpresse" (lying press), as it is called in Germany, would only spread false Government information. This declining confidence in institutions is going right on with the popularity of all kinds of the media, also through social media-spreading and conspiracy theories about the disastrous influence of Islam.

Visibility.

By the unification of the European visa policy over the past two decades, asylum seekers are, from the beginning of the 21st century, more and more forced to take dangerous sea routes. Thus their dramatic travel attracts a lot more media attention than the quieter and less visible entry in the 1990s. The massiveness of the crowded boats also promotes the idea that it is a relentless endless "flow" of people.

Conclusion

While unease about migration from the eighties of the previous century rose, as a result of the disappearance of internal borders, Europeans themselves in the European Union got unprecedented opportunities to move and relocate and to seek employment. Hundreds of thousands of Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Czech and Bulgarians, but also other Union citizens made use of this new freedom. Also those migrants have caused frictions and protests, and sometimes still do, but on the whole these Europeans seem to have placed themselves successfully outside the negative

"migration" discourse. With the disappearance of internal borders the focus is on guarding the external borders, and thus there is a new opposition between "them" and "us". A contrast where currently, especially the refugees are the victims. Whether Europe will cope with them in a humane way, and how big the support base for that will, just as in 1517, be to a large extent dependent on the way in which national and European authorities can come to a common policy. And, unfortunately, there are no positive prospects for the time being.

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